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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, I^TATE OF UTAH

VARIAN - EIMAC, INC. and/or
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE,
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Case No. 870344-CA

vs.
HELEN D. LAMOREAUX, THE SECOND
INJURY FUND, and THE UTAH
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,

Category 6

Respondents.
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AND/OR EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In its Order Granting Motion for Review, the
Industrial Commission erroneously interpreted and failed to
apply the standard of legal causation sfet forth in Allen v.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) for cases
involving workers with a pre-existing condition aggravated
by an industrial injury.

In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court

clearly stated that before benefits can be awarded to a worker
in such instances, he ". . . must show t|:hat the employment
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he
already faced in everyday life because of his condition.

This

additional element of risk in the workplace is usually
supplied by an exertion greater than that undertaken in normal,
everyday life."

Id. at 25.

In the instant case, respondent

Lamoreaux was indisputedly suffering from a pre-existing back
condition at the time of her back injury at issue.
Furthermore, the evidence revealed that the event precipitating
her injury was the lifting, from waist level, of an 18
1/2-pound x-ray tube.

This activity does not constitute "an

exertion greater than that undertaken in
life."

normal everyday

Thus, under the law set forth in Allen, Ms. Lamoreaux

is clearly not entitled to worker's compensation benefits for
the injury she suffered on November 15, 1985.

The Commission's

award of benefits should, therefore, be reversed, and the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge should be reinstated.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ORDER IS UNSUPPORTED
BY EITHER LEGAL PRECEDENCE OR FACTUAL EVIDENCE.
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-84 (1953 as amended)

provides that upon review of a Commission order, the Court may
set aside the award if the Commission acted "without or in
excess of its powers" or if "the findings of fact do not
support the award."

In the instant case, the Commission acted

contrary to law and thus, outside the scope of its powers.
Additionally, its decision is not supported by the evidence.
Therefore, its Order should be reversed and the Findings and
Order of the Administrative Law Judge reinstated.

-2-

A.

The Commission was Acting Outside the Scope of Its
Jurisdiction in Formulating a New Standard of
Legal Causation for Cases Involving Allegedly
Job-Induced Preexisting Conditions.
The Commission's Order purports to award benefits to

Ms. Lamoreaux on the grounds her preexisting back problem was
solely the result of her employment activities with Varian Eimac.

According to the Commission, an applicant with such a

preexisting condition is not bound by the higher standard
of legal causation despite the clarity of that requirement, as
set forth in Allen, for cases involving aggravated
preexisting conditions.

The Order of the Commission in this

regard directly contravenes the standard of compensability
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court since the Court in Allen
made no distinction between job-induced preexisting conditions
by the same employer and preexisting conditions attributable to
non-employment life or to the working qonditions of a different
employer.
The level of legal causation to be applied in any
given case is clearly a question of lawl

As the Utah Supreme

Court stated in Cudahay Packing Company of Nebraska v.
Brown, 210 P. 608, 610 (Utah 1922), "[thhe legal effect of the
evidence produced is a question of law which is the duty of
this Court to decide."

The rule that no deference should be

given to Commission findings on questions of law was once again
reaffirmed by the Court in Utah Consolidated Mining Company v.
Industrial Commission of Utah, 240 P. 4^0, 442 (Utah 1925)
where it stated:

-3-

No doubt the Commission may misapply some
provision of the statute or positive law in
making or denying an award. If the
Commission does so and makes an award for
compensation which is contrary to law, it
does what is not sanctioned by the law
under which it acts, and hence, as it is
expressed in the statute, it acts in excess
of its jurisdiction.
Although both Cudahay and Utah Consolidated Mining were
decided under prior law, the statute providing for review of
Commission decisions was the same as the statute applicable
herein.

Inasmuch as Allen clearly states the positive law

governing the compensability of Industrial Commission claims,
the Commission's blatant disregard of the standard established
by the Utah Supreme Court in favor of fashioning a standard of
its own clearly violates the scope of its authority and
warrants reversal by this Court.

B.

There is no Evidence in the Record to Support
Ms. Lamoreaux's Claim that Her Preexisting
Back Condition is Due Solely to Her Work
Activities at Varian - Eimac.

In the medical panel report, Dr. Girard Vanderhooft,
the medical panel physician, states:
I do believe that there was a
pre-existing weakness of the~"ligaments
which would make intervertebral disc
herniation more likelyT This was
evidenced by the fact that she [Ms.
Lamoreaux] had sought chiropractic
treatments in April and August prior to her
injury in November.
. . . Considering all factors, however, I
believe that a 15 percent permanent partial
impairment of the whole person is the
appropriate impairment rating in this state
-4-

and at this time. I think that the
permanent impairment would justly be
divided equally between the pre-existing
condition and the injury of November 15,
1985. That is, 7 1/2 percent whole person
impairment due to the pre-existing
condition and 7 1/2 percent is due to the
injury of November 15, 1985. I . . .
(Emphasis added.)
(R. at 249.)

Ms. Lamoreaux does not contest the above

finding by the medical panel doctor of

preexisting condition

in her back rendering her more suscepti >le to injury at the
time of her disc herniation on November 15, 1985. Rather, she
claims that the preexisting condition identified by Dr.
Vanderhooft was wholly job-induced by her employment duties at
Varian.

Her claim to this effect is based largely on the fact

that she had not experienced any symptomatic back problems
prior to her employment with the appellant.

Case law is clear,

however, that a preexisting condition need not be known to the
applicant in order to be considered preexisting for purposes of
Allen.

For example, in Justice Zimmerman's concurring

opinion in Holloway v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 729
P.2d 31 (Utah 1986), he states:
. . . I would observe that th^ preexisting
condition of which Allen speaks need not
be patent; in fact, it need nqt have been
known or knowable to anyone bdfore the
injury. The sole question is (whether the
worker came to the workplace with a
condition that increased his risk of
injury. If he did and that condition
contributed to the injury, then Allen's
higher standard of legal casuation comes
into play so as to place that Worker on the
same footing as one who did not come to
work with a preexisting condition.
(Emphasis added.)

-5-

Id. at 32. Thus, a quiescent preexisting problem brought to
light by an industrial injury is sufficient to invoke the
higher standard of legal causation mandated by Allen for
purposes of determining compensability.
Although Ms. Lamoreaux and the Industrial Commission
claim that her preexisting condition is attributable solely to
her employment with Varian, the evidence is to the contrary.
At the time of her injury, Ms. Lamoreaux weighed approximately
190 pounds and had been at at least this weight for a number of
years.

(R. at 73.)

She was also suffering from preexisting

arthritis in her back.

This fact is evidenced by the office

notes of Dr. Wayne Zundell who, on April 22, 1985, made the
following entry:
Lifting at work and at home and injured her
back four days ago.
Arthritis - was much improved until she
lifted tube at work and irritated back.
Next morning, bent over to pick up a child
and sudden onset of severe, non-radiating
low back pain. Better today, but still
disabling.
(R. at 143.)
Furthermore, the notes of Dr. Thomas Bowman dated
December 9, 1985 indicate that Ms. Lamoreaux had had a previous
history of back problems dating back "over a couple of years".
(R. at 96).

Even the Employer's First Report of Injury signed

by Ms. Lamoreaux indicates that she had had ongoing problems
with her back for some time and had been seeing a
chiropractor.

(R. at 186.)

In fact, the applicant testified

that she had experienced some rather severe low back pain in
-6-

both April and August of 1985.

In April, her back pain was

severe enough to lead her to seek the assistance of Dr. Sharp,
a chiropractor, and in August it led her to seek the assistance
of both Dr. Sharp and Dr. Zundell, a medical doctor.
28-30.)

(R. at

And finally, Mr. Rand Holding, a supervisor of Ms.

Lamoreaux, testified that approximately a week to a week and a
half prior to the time of her injury of November 15, 1985, Ms.
Lamoreaux reported to him, upon arriving at work, that she had
felt something pop in her back as she got out of her car that
morning.

(R. at 90, 93.)

All of this evidence points to the

existence of a back condition either predating Ms. Lamoreaux's
employment with the employer or brought] about or aggravated by
non-employment activities.

In Jones v.| California Packing

Corp., 244 P.2d 640, 644 (Ut. 1952), thb Utah Supreme Court
stated that law does not invest the Commission with the
"arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted,
competent, credible evidence."

In the instant case, that is

exactly what the Commission has done for there is no evidence
to suggest Ms. Lamoreaux did not have a preexisting
condition, nor is there evidence to support the Commission and
the respondent's theory that any preexisting condition she did
have was wholly induced by her work at yarian - Eimac.
It should be noted at this point that in determining
compensability, it is important to keep the issues of legal and
medical causation separate and distinct!

The fact that medical

causation may be concretely established does not render an
injury compensable unless the requisite legal causation is also
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proven.

Professor Larson, in his treatise on workmen's

compensation, states:
All too often these two tests [the legal
test and the medical test] are scrambled
together. When this happens, the effect is
usually that one is lost sight of. Thus,
obsession with the legal test of unusual
exertion may lead to a holding that a very
slight exertion, because it satisfies the
legal test in being unusual for this
employee, is adequate to support an award,
although its ability medically to account
for the collapse seems remote. Conversely,
obsession with medical causation sometimes
leads to a slighting of the need for
precision in defining the legal rule, with
the result that decisions may be based on
statements by doctors that the exertion did
or did not cause the heart attack, although
neither the doctors nor the lawyers may
have had a clear
and consistent concept of
what 'caused1 meant in this setting.
Larson, Workmen's Compensation (Desk Ed.) § 38.83 (1987).
In view of the evidence adduced in this case, it
appears that the Commission's decision to award Ms. Lamoreaux
benefits is based largely on the medical panel's finding that
the lifting of 18 1/2 pounds can cause a disc herniation like
that suffered by her.

Standing alone, however, this finding is

not sufficient to sustain an award for the issue of legal
causation must still be addressed.

In the instant case, the

Administrative Law Judge correctly applied the higher standard
of legal causation identified in Allen and found in favor of
the defendant/employer.
In view of the fact that there is no evidence to
support Ms. Lamoreaux's claim that her preexisting condition
was solely the result of work activities at Varian, and in view
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of the uncontradicted medical evidence that respondent did have
a preexisting back condition, it is clear that the unusual
exertion standard should have been appl:ied in determining the
compensability of her claim.

The Commi|sssion's failure to

acknowledge the evidence of record and to apply the correct
legal standard in rendering its decisio|n is clearly arbitrary
and capricious and should be reversed.

C.

The Applicant's Work Activities) on November 15, 1985
Do Not Constitute Unusual Exertlion under Allen.
Respondent contends that evenl if the unusual exertion

test is the proper test to be applied in the instant case, her
activities on November 15, 1985 constitute unusual exertion due
to their repetitious nature. As support for this position,
she cites Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi, 631
P.2d 888 (Utah 1981).

Monfredi, however, was decided under

prior law and the issue addressed by the Court was whether the
applicant had sustained a "definite identifiable injury" or
accident as that term was then defined.

The issues of legal

and medical causation were never discussed.

In view of this

fact, Monfredi is not controlling in the instant case.
Varian does not contest respondents allegation
that an injury which is the result of repetitive exertions may
be compensable.

However, Varian notes that claims for such

injuries are still subject to the requirements of Allen.
This fact is borne out by the Supreme Court's decision in
Miera v. Industrial Commission, 728 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1986).

-9-

In Miera, the Administrative Law Judge denied the
applicant's claim because the onset of his pain was gradual,
not identified with a specific event and was related to his
normal work activities.

In reversing the agency's decision,

the Supreme Court noted that Allen had "redefined the
unexpected result of a work-related activity as a compensable
accident if both medical and legal causation could be shown."
Id. at 1024.

It then went on to find that although Miera

had a preexisting condition "his jumps into an eight-foot hole
from a four-foot platform at thirty-minute intervals,"
constituted unusual exertion sufficient to meet the higher
standard of legal causation required of workers with
preexisting conditions.

:[d. at 1024 1025.

Since medical

causation was also evident from the record, benefits were
awarded.
Although the Court, in Miera, found that jumping
into an eight-foot hole at thirty-minute intervals meets the
higher standard of legal causation under Allen, the lifting
of 18 1/2 pounds from waist level is clearly not unusual
exertion when compared to typical non-employment activity.
Although in her brief, Ms. Lamoreaux describes the duties of
her employment as lifting a Bl-90 x-ray tube from the floor,
turning and carrying it and setting it down from 4 0 to 60 times
a day, her testimony at the time of the hearing was much
different.

During cross-examination, Ms. Lamoreaux was

questioned in detail about her work activities.

She indicated

that she had only been working on the Bl-90 part for
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approximately six months prior to the date of her injury.
at 55, 56.)

(R.

She also testified that she was required to lift

each part she worked on between six and ten times and that she
worked on no more than six Bl-90's per day.

(R. at 56.) Ms.

Lamoreaux further stated that she worked at a workbench of just
below chest height and that although she initially had to pick
up the Bl-90s out of a tub on the floor near her work area,
the other times she lifted the part it was from her workbench.
(R. at 57.)

And finally, she testified that once she had

completed her work on a particular Bl-9|(0, she would pick it up
and take it to some other location. (I^«. at 57.)

It is also

significant that Ms. Lamoreaux did not Iwork on the Bl-90s
every day and that the other parts on ^hich she worked were
smaller.

(R. at 63.)

In fact, according to her testimony, she

worked on the Bl-90 on an average of onblly one time per week,
depending on the order.

(R. at 63.)

In view of the above-cited testimony, appellants
contend that the employment duties associated with Ms.
Lamoreaux1s work on the Bl-90s do not cpnstitute unusual
exertion as that term has been defined in Allen.

The

respondent worked on such parts only onk
ice a week on the
average.

Furthermore, even when she did work on those parts,

she had only to lift them one time each from the floor with the
remainder of the work being performed from her workbench for
the purpose of changing the position of the tube.

There is no

evidence that she was working in a confined or cramped area,
and she was not working on an assembly line such that any of
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the lifting done by her had to be made at a constant rate of
speed.

Under these circumstances, the Administrative Law Judge

properly applied the legal causation test announced in Allen
and denied benefits.

II.

THE COMMISSION HAD NO JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW AS THE
MOTION WAS NOT TIMELY FILED.

Unfortunately, appellants are not in a position to
respond to many of the arguments raised by the respondent in
support of her claim that the filing of her Motion for Review
was timely.

In its Order Granting Motion for Review, the

Commission failed to make any factual findings or otherwise
address the timeliness issue even though it was raised by
appellants in their Response to Motion for Review.
274.)

(R. at

The evidence presented by Ms. Lamoreaux in the form of

Mr. Henriksen's Affidavit and the letter from Barbara
Elicerio are not a part of the record and appellants are
unable to address the allegations raised in them.

Appellant's

contention that Ms. Lamoreaux failed to timely file her
Motion for Review is based upon the statutory time requirements
for filing a Motion for Review and the date respondents Motion
was stamped as having been filed with the Commission.
In their original brief, appellants indicated that
Ms. Lamoreaux1s. Motion for Review should have been filed on
or before February 16, 1987. The applicant points out in her
brief, however, that February 16th was President's Day and
the Commission was not open, thus, her Motion for Review was
-12-

not due until February 17th.
conceded.

This poirit is herewith

Even so, appellants note that a copy of respondent's

Motion was not date stamped as having been received in their
counsel's office until February 23, 198 7, a full six days after
the date the Motion was allegedly hand delivered to the
Commission and mailed to all opposing counsel.
Addendum, Exhibit A.)

(See

Inasmuch as it is appellant's counsel's

experience that documents mailed from ope Salt Lake City
address to another are generally delivered within one to two
days after mailing, the late receipt by them of respondent's
Motion still leads them to question the timeliness of
respondent's filing.
In her response to the timelijiess issue, Ms.
Lamoreaux alleges that worker's compensation statutes are to
be liberally construed.

While appellants generally agree with

this position, the rule of liberal construction was not
intended to apply to the time requirements imposed on filings
of jurisdictional magnitude.

While thelconcept of what

constitutes a filing may be liberally construed, the time
within which a filing is required to be made must, of
necessity, be strictly enforced, for to do otherwise renders
such time limitations meaningless.
Ms. Lamoreaux also cites Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and several cases interpreting that
rule in support of her claim that the Commission should not be
deprived of its jurisdiction to hear her motion due to her
alleged late filing.

Rule 60(b) provides for the setting aside
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of a final judgment, order or proceeding on the basis of
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.

..."

In the instant case, respondent was admittedly aware of the
date on which her Motion for Review was due.

Her subsequent

failure to timely file the Motion, therefore, fails to meet the
basic requirements of the rule, thus rendering relief under it
inappropriate.
Finally, appellants allege that the untimely filing
of a Motion for Review is a defect of jurisdictional magnitude
which cannot be waived by the Commission anymore than the late
filing of an appeal may be waived by this Court under Rule 3(a)
of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

This position is

supported by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Griffith v.
Industrial Commission, 16 Ut.2d 264, 399 P.2d 204 (1965).

In

Griffith, the applicant's Petition for Rehearing was denied
by the Commission as being untimely made.

On appeal, the

Supreme Court reversed, noting that the applicant's Petition
was timely filed when the three days allowed for mailing were
taken into account.

It then stated:

. . . [R]ealizing that the last day of
the 3 0-day period allowed by Section
35-1-82, U.C.A. 1953 fell on February 22, a
state holiday, the plaintiff's petition for
rehearing was timely filed; and therefore,
this court has jurisdiction for review
under Section 35-1-82, U.C.A. 1953
requiring for preservation of the right to
judicial review a timely request for
rehearing on the Commission's decision.
(Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 206.

Since the record reflects a late filing by the

respondent, the Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain her
-14-

Motion for Review and its Order granting the same should be
vacated.

CONCLUSION
The Commission had no jurisdiction to enter its Order
Granting Motion for Review since Ms. Lamoreaux1s Motion for
Review was not timely filed.

The failure to timely file a

motion for review is a failure of jurisdictional magnitude.
Therefore, the Commission's Order should be vacated and the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge should be reinstated
and affirmed.
Assuming, arguendo, that the [Commission's Order was
properly entered, the record below does not substantiate to any
degree the Industrial Commission's claim that Ms. Lamoreaux's
job at Varian - Eimac was the sole cauqe of her preexisting
back problems. Moreover, the law does |not require a
preexisting problem to be non-industrial before the higher
standard of legal causation is invoked for purposes of
determining compensability.

Since the bedical evidence of

record indicates Ms. Lamoreaux was suffering from arthritis in
her back and had sought medical treatment for her back on
several prior occasions for injuries occurring both at work and
at home, and because the medical panel report clearly states
Ms. Lamoreaux was suffering from a preexisting condition at the
time of her injury, her claim for benefits must necessarily be
denied for failure to meet the higher standard of legal
causation under Allen.

Accordingly, the Administrative Law
-15-

Judge's ruling was correct and it should be reinstated by this
Court.
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
CASE No. 860001 55
HELEN D. LAMOREAUX,
*

Applicant,

*
*
*
*
*

VARIAN-EIMAC, INC., AND/OR
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE, AND SEOND INJURY
FUND

MOTION FOR REVIEW OF FINDINGS
OF F ACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
W ORDER

Defendants.
*
h

h

i

*

A

t

*

COMES
attorney,

C.

*

A

NOW

\

I

t

Helen

h

I

A

D.

Richard Henriksen,

Lamoreaux,

by and

through

her

Jr., of the firm of Henriksen,

Henriksen, & Call, P.C. and moves that fthe Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order of the Honbrable Administrative Law
Judge, Gilbert A. Martinez, be reviewed] by the Indistrial
Commission.

Such motion is based upon ^:he following particular

errors and objections:
1.

That the Findings of Fact do not include the fact

that the Bl-90 centers were lifted six to ten times each, six
centers per day for between 40 and 60 times per day, which is not
what an average person does in normal, every day life.
2.

Prior to the time that Helen Lamoreaux began work

for Varian-Eimac, Inc., she had no pre-existing injury
whatsoever.

That the treatments in April and in Auqust of 1985

were directly related to her employment, and in particular, to
torquing and lifting on the job.
3.

The Findings of Fact do not include a finding that

the automobile collision the applicant sustained when she was
approximately 17 years of age did not result in a long-term
injury, except for some minor pain to her back, which went away
after a short time.
4.

As of February, 1980 when the claimant, Helen

Lamoreaux, went to work for Varian-Eimac, Inc., she had no preexisting injuries whatsover.
5.

That the Administrative Law Judge has misapplied

the laws of the state of Utah, and in particular, the Allen vs.
Industrial Commission 46 Utah A.R.3 (Utah 1986).

When that case is

applied since Helen lifted Bl-90's 40 to 60 times per day which
weigh approximately 18 1/2 lbs., which is not an average person
would normally do in an average day, compensation should be
awarded.

Also Helen's case is distinguishable from the Allen case,

in that case, the claimant had sustained three separate,
identifiable, pre-existing injuries prior to employment with the
employer.

In this case, any pre-existing problems were caused by

working with this employer and Helen did not bring with her to the
work place, with a condition that increased her risk of injury, buy
all of the increase and risk of injury was contributed to and caused
by her employment.

When the legal causation test of the Allen

decision is used, the question is whether the employee came to the worl
place with a condition that increased the risk of injury, and then i
important to consider a worker who comes to work for the employer
without any increased risk of injury, and because of the work that

the employee is required to perform, causes a failure.

In the

opinion of the Administrative Law JudgeL the claimant would be
compensible under a long line of decisions prior to Allen.
case is distinguishable from the Allen case.

This

The claimant did not

bring to the work place a personal increase in the risk of injury
and compensation should be awarded.

This is a case very similar to

the case of Kaiser Steel Corporation vsl Monfredi 631 p.2d 888
(Utah 1981) wherein Monfredi, the applicant who had a History of
back problems, was awarded compensation|because of a climax due to
exertion, stress and other repetitive cAuses at his work place.
Also see Schmidt vs. Industrial Commission of Utah 617 p.2d 693.
DATED this 17th day of February, 1987.

Richafrfl Henr^tsbn, Jr,
Attorney for Applicant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Helen D. Lamoreaux
5541 South 2775 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

84118

Employers Mutual Liability
P.O. Box 7400
Murray, Utah 84107
Attn: Dick Sagura
Michael E. Dyer
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah

84110

Erie V. Boorman, Admilm' sf-r^i-or
Second Injury Fund
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